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Antecedents of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Revisited 
Shabtai Rosenne 
O N JULY 17, 1998 the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court adopted the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court .{hereafter Rome Statute or 
Statute).l This was the culmination of the hopes and dreams of many genera, 
tions of international lawyers and others who aimed at seeing international 
law placed on a sounder basis than the voluntarist conceptions so character, 
istic of it. 
One hundred and sixty States took part in the Conference, held in Rome be, 
tween June 15 and July 17, 1998. Thirty,one official organizations and other 
entities were represented at the Conference by observers. In addition, observ, 
ers from 134 non,governmental organizations participated. The Rome Statute 
was adopted on a non,recorded vote of 120 in favor, seven against, and 21 ab, 
stentions, the remaining States not taking part in the vote. The purpose of this 
article is to retrace briefly the developments that led to the Rome Statute, to' 
gether with some afterthoughts. 
It is a pleasure to dedicate this article to my friend of about fifty years standing, Leslie 
Green. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Hans,Peter Gasser, 
Editor,in.Chief of the International Review of the Red Cross, in preparing this article. 
Antecedents of the Rome Statute of the ICC Revisited 
In the Beginning (1872-1914) 
It is common knowledge that in the Middle Ages knights could be "tried" by 
their peers of another people or another fiefdom for violation of the accepted 
canons of knightly behavior or for allowing particularly vicious acts to be per' 
formed by soldiers under their authority. A well, known example of this is the 
so-called Breisach trial of 1447. Z These, however, were hardly war crimes trials 
as we understand them today. Rather they were knightly courts of honor decid, 
ing on violations, direct or indirect, of knightly codes. 
Another attempt at quasi, criminal international proceedings encountered 
during the mid,nineteenth century should be noted. As part of its campaign 
against the slave trade, Great Britain concluded a series of bilateral agree' 
ments. These allowed duly commissioned ships of the Royal Navy to visit and 
search on the high seas flag vessels of the other State, and bring vessels sus' 
pee ted of engaging in illegal slave trade operations into port. Here they would 
be brought before a mixed commission for adjudication. The mb:ed commis, 
sion would decide, without appeal, whether or not a vessel brought before it 
was a slave ship trading illicitly and legally captured, and would accordingly ei, 
ther condemn it as lawful prize and liberate the slaves it carried, or acquit it and 
restore both the vessels and the slaves to their owners. These mixed commis, 
sions had no jurisdiction over the owners, masters or crews of the condemned 
vessels. Individuals were to be handed over to their own authorities for trial and 
punishment in their own courts and according to their own laws. MLxed com, 
missions of this kind sat to the east along the coast from the Cape of Good 
Hope to the Cape Verde Islands, and in the west from Rio de Janeiro to New 
York, with the court at Freetown, Sierra Leone, being the most important. It is 
estimated that over 600 slave vessels were condemned by these commissions 
and that some 80,000 slaves were liberated by them. They functioned between 
1819 and 1871) 
Credit for the first attempt in modem times to develop a system of an inter, 
national criminal tribunal goes to Gustave Moynier of Switzerland. Moynier, 
together with Henry Dunant, was one of the founders of the International Red 
Cross, through the Geneva Red Cross Conference of 1863,4 followed by the 
first Geneva Conference of 1864. That Conference adopted the Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field 
of 22 August 1864.5 Dismayed at the failure of the belligerents in the 
Franco,Prussian War of 1870-1871 to observe faithfully the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention in its first real test, Moynier conceived the idea of an es, 
tablished standing international machinery to make it possible to try 
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individuals who allegedly violated the provisions of the Convention.6 He was 
able to persuade his colleagues of what became known as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to circulate his proposal to the national commit-
tees, for consideration at a future Red Cross Conference'? 
The gist of Moynier's proposal was that as soon as war had been declared, 
the President of the Swiss Confederation was to choose by lot three Powers 
party to the Geneva Convention, excluding belligerents. The three govern-
ments, together with those of the belligerents, were to be invited to nominate 
an "adjudicator" [arbitre]. Those five persons would constitute a tribunal. That 
tribunal, however, would deal only with breaches of the Convention that had 
been the subject of complaints addressed to it by interested governments. The 
tribunal was to subject the facts to an adversarial inquiry and then present its 
decision, for each individual case, as a verdict of guilty or not guilty. If guilt was 
established, the tribunal was to pronounce a penalty, in accordance with provi-
sions ofinternationallaw. The latter were to be the "subject of a treaty which is 
complementary" to the proposed convention on the international judicial 
body. The tribunal was to notify its judgments to interested governments. 
These, for their part, were to impose on those found guilty the penalties that 
had been pronounced against them. Another interesting provision was to the 
effect that where a complaint was accompanied by a request for damages and 
interest, the tribunal would be competent to rule on that claim and to fix the 
amount of the compensation. "The government of the offender will be respon-
sible for implementing the decision." In this scheme, what was permanent was 
not the tribunal itself but the mechanism for the establishment of a tribunal in 
time of war. 
This proposal did not receive a warm welcome. A longish note by Moynier's 
friend and colleague, the Belgian jurist G. Rolin-Jaequemyns, gives the text 
of replies received from several eminent internationalists of that epoch. 
These included F. Lieber of the United States of America,8 A. Morin of France, 
F. de Holtzendorff of Germany, John Westlake of Great Britain, and the 
Asamblea espanola de la Asociacion internacional para el secorso de los 
heridos en campana of Madrid-apparently the only national society to reply 
to the circular.9 
Moynier's proposal attacked several of the centrai problems that the idea of 
a permanent international criminal court raises. Among these are the selection 
of the judges, the law to be applied, jurisdiction both ratione personae and 
ratione materiae and its scope ratione temporis, the enforcement of the decision, 
and the relation between the criminal responsibility of an individual even 
though the agent of the State and the international responsibility of the State 
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itself (an aspect now regulated by Article 3 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 
1907 with respect to the laws and customs of war on land).10 The proposal 
bears traces showing that it could have been inspired by a combination of fac~ 
tors. These include the general attack on international law as "law" without 
regular enforcement machinery through standing courts; the influence of the 
Alabama arbitration taking place in Moynier's hometown and the seat of the 
Red Cross, Geneva; dismay in Red Cross circles at the relative weakness of the 
Geneva Convention brought out during the Franco~Prussian war; and perhaps 
to some extent the experience of the Central Commission of the Rhine that 
was exercising some civil and criminal jurisdiction, even if of limited and local~ 
ized scope. 
However, the proposal was ahead of its time. No international experience 
had been acquired of any permanent international judicial instance of univer~ 
sal competence. The absence of an agreed international code on the law of war 
and on the conduct of warfare, and setting forth what acts, when committed by 
an individual, could be considered criminal, detracted from the feasibility of 
any kind of international criminal tribunal at that period. Furthermore, the 
concept of extradition formalized in national legislation and in international 
treaties was relatively undeveloped and there was-and still is-well~marked 
reticence on the part of many influential States to allow the extradition of their 
nationals, save perhaps in the most exceptional circumstances. The existence 
of factors such as these was not propitious for the fundamental innovation in 
international law and practice that the creation of an international judicial in~ 
stance exercising jurisdiction over an individual acting as agent of the State 
would entail, even on so limited a scale as Moynier envisaged. 
In this connection, it is interesting to observe that after the failure of 
Moynier's initiative in 1872, the International Committee of the Red Cross did 
not return to the idea of establishing an international criminal court to try indi~ 
viduals accused of violations of the Geneva Conventions. Instead, it focused its 
attention more on securing national legislation criminalizing individuals for 
such violations. The issue of an international penal jurisdiction does not seem 
to have been bised in the Geneva Red Cross Conferences of 1929, 1949, and 
1974-1977. The most that occurred was in connection with the 1949 confer~ 
ence, where the International Committee suggested including in all the Con~ 
ventions to be adopted at that Conference a provision regarding grave 
breaches. According to that suggestion, grave breaches were to be punished as 
crimes against the law of nations by the tribunals of any of the parties to the 
Convention "or by any international jurisdiction." This proposal, however, was 
not pursued)! 
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Nevertheless, Moynier's initiative was not without practical consequences. 
His reference to international law that was to be made was followed by a rapid 
spurt in the development of the jus in bello, the law governing the conduct of 
warfare. That was prompted, of course, by a combination of many diverse at~ 
tributes. These included, alongside the intellectual and humanitarian activism, 
rapid technological advances in that period, both generally and in the weapons 
of war. This development ran on two~parallel and interactive lines. One was a 
series of intergovernmental treaty~making conferences-at Brussels (1874), 
The Hague (1899, 1907) and London (1908-1909). The second was activity de 
lege ferenda on a grand scale by the Institute of International Law (of which 
Moynier was one of the founders), leading to a series of resolutions on different 
aspects. The most important was the Oxford Manual on the laws of war on land 
of 1880 and a parallel manual on the laws of naval war governing the relations 
between belligerents, also adopted at Oxford (1913).12 Many prominent inter~ 
national lawyers and diplomats were active on both those tracks. At the same 
time, individual scholars were beginning to look into the question. 13 
The law embodied in the Geneva Conventions, from 1864 up to and includ~ 
ing the Additional Protocols of 1977, used to be termed "Geneva law," and the 
succession of treaties, declarations, and other instruments governing the con~ 
duct of warfare was designated as "Hague law." Geneva law was concerned 
with individuals-victims of war (military and civilian) and the perpetrators of 
violations of the laws and customs established for their protection, whether 
military or civilian personnel. Hague law dealt with the rights and duties of 
States in their conduct of warfare. Breach of the applicable treaties could lead 
to a case of State responsibility. The black~letter texts were at this stage 
couched in the language of rights and duties of States as the subjects ofinterna~ 
tionallaw. They paid little attention to the actions of individuals, whether in a 
position of command and authority, or subordinates. They show little signs of 
recognition of the importance and relevance of military hierarchy. Both sets of 
treaties and the law that they enunciate have become heavily encrusted with 
rules and practices of customary international law generated by the black~letter 
texts. These largely place responsibility for the application of the rules oflaw on 
individuals (especially members of the armed forces) as the instrumentalities 
through which States act or even when an individual is acting sua sponte and 
not under orders. 
In addition, the development of the concept of human rights on a universal 
scale embodied in the Charter of the UN and amplified in the Universal Decla~ 
ration of Human Rights and other instruments has had a direct impact on this 
branch of the law. One consequence has been that the distinction between 
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Geneva law and Hague law has become increasingly artificial, especially when 
the law envisages individual criminal responsibility for violations. The two 
branches of the law are now plaited together as international humanitarian 
law, which nonetheless maintains the distinction between the international re~ 
sponsibility of the State and the criminal responsibility of an individual. It is not 
clear when the term "international humanitarian law" was first used. The In~ 
ternational Court ofJustice has endorsed it.14 Established competence "in rele~ 
vant areas of international law such as international humanitarian law" is one 
of the qualifications required for judges of the new Court by Article 36, para~ 
graph 3 (b) (ii), of the Rome Statute. 
Intermezzo: The Peace Treaties and the League of Nations (1919-1939) 
A major step forward was taken in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919.15 Article 
227 envisaged the trial of the Kaiser Wilhelm II by a special tribunal "for a su~ 
preme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." The 
special tribunal was to be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and to be guided by the highest mo~ 
tives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations 
of international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It was 
to fix the punishment which it thought should be imposed. The Allied and As~ 
socia ted Powers "will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands 
[to which the Kaiser had fled on his abdication as Emperor of Germany] for the 
surrender [not "extradition"] to them of the ex~Emperor in order that he may 
be put on trial." As is well known, the Dutch Government refused to "surren~ 
der" the Kaiser, and the matter of his trial was quietly dropped. The signifi~ 
cance of this provision is its recognition-probably the first instance in modern 
times-that the Head of State can be criminally liable for violations of interna~ 
tionallaw, not limited to international humanitarian law or what we would to~ 
day call "war crimes."16 In addition, Article 228 provided that the Allied and 
Associated Powers could bring before military tribunals persons accused of 
having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Article 229 
provided for the trial of persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of 
one of the Allied and Associated Powers before the military tribunals of that 
power. All those provisions, however, came up against the obstacle that Ger~ 
man law did not permit the extradition of German nationals, and apparently 
viewed "surrender" as another word for "extradition." Some Germans accused 
of war crimes were tried by German Courts. However, on the \,:hole, in practice 
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those provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were not satisfactory.17 Their im~ 
portance is more conceptual. 
Thus, the modem process had begun. 
The next step was taken a year later, in 1920. The Committee ofJurists ap~ 
pointed under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to prepare 
the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice adopted a resolu~ 
tion for the establishment of a High Court ofInternational Justice, to try crimes 
constituting a breach of international public order or against the universal law 
of nations referred to it by the League Assembly or Council. This Court would 
have the power to define the nature of the crime, fix the penalty, and decide 
the appropriate means of carrying out the sentence. The resolution came be~ 
fore the first session of the League Assembly (1920) which, however, did not 
adopt it, and the matter was accordingly dropped. I8 
At this point, nongovernmental organizations began to show interest in the 
matter. Drafts were prepared by the Inter~Parliamentary Union, the Interna~ 
tional Law Association, the International Congress of Penal Law and the Inter~ 
national Association of Penal Law (this latter adopting a proposal by V.V. Pella, 
who was to play an important role after the Second World War).I9 At that stage 
there was a widespread feeling-not shared in political circles-that in one way 
or another appropriate competence should be conferred on the Permanent 
Court ofInternationalJustice, then a new and untried international institution. 
On the diplomatic front, the Special International Conference on Repres~ 
sion of Terrorism was in session from 1 to 16 November 1937. It adopted a 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and a Conven~ 
tion for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, neither of which, 
however, entered into force. 2o That Court's jurisdiction was limited to the of~ 
fenses set out in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment ofTerror~ 
ism. The judges were to be nominated by States parties, and chosen by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. The Convention was quite detailed, 
with 56 articles in all (including the final clauses). Considering the general de~ 
terioration of the international situation by 1937, it is quite remarkable that 
this Conference, attended by 31 States-including the Soviet Union, but not 
Germany, Italy or Japan--could reach agreement on such complex texts, 
something that really was to elude the United Nations until 1998. 
Restart in the United Nations (1945-1967) 
The Declaration on the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme 
AuthOrity with Respect to Germany, signed at Berlin on June 5, 1945, was the 
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next major advance.21 Article 11 of that instrument required the German au~ 
thorities to apprehend and surrender to the Allies all persons from time to time 
named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allies as having 
been suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analo~ 
gous offenses. This was followed by the Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, signed at London 
on August 8, 1945.22 The precedent of the Treaty of Versailles was not being 
followed, and the prohibition of German law on the extradition or surrender of 
German nationals leading to their trial in a foreign court was made inoperative. 
The unconditional surrender of Germany made this possible. 
It is unnecessary here to go over the story of the London Agreement and the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, January 
19, 1946,23 and of the N iirnberg and Tokyo Tribunals. They set in motion pow~ 
erful trends for the establishment of a permanent international criminal tribu~ 
nal to avoid the creation of ad hoc tribunals in the future. The first major move 
in that direction accompanied the drafting of the Convention on the Preven~ 
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948.24 Article 
VI of that Convention provides: 
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III 
[conspiracy, incitement, attempt or complicity regarding genocide] shall be tried 
by a competent tribunal in the State in the territory of which the act was 
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with 
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.25 
When the General Assembly adopted that Convention and opened it for 
signature, it also adopted Resolution 230 (II) B. Here it invited the newly 
formed International Law Commission to study the desirability and possibility 
of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged 
with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon 
that organ by other internati~mal agreements. It requested the International 
Law Commission to pay attention to the possibility of establishing a Criminal 
Chamber of the International Court of Justice. That resolution must be 
regarded as the starting point of the process that led to the Rome Statute of 
1998. Its point of departure was the work accomplished during the period of the 
League of Nations and the 1945 activities of the victorious Allies, but future 
developments were unrestricted.26 
At its first session in 1949, the International Law Commission held a prelim~ 
inary discussion. It rejected proposals to postpone the matter to the following 
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session and decided to appoint a rapporteur to report to that next session. At its 
33rd meeting it appointed two rapporteurs, R.J. Alfaro (Panama) and Judge 
A.E.F. Sandstrom (Sweden), to prepare working papers on the topicP The 
two working papers were duly presented. Each examined the two aspects men, 
tioned specifically in the General Assembly's resolution, namely the general 
question, and the particular aspect of the employing of the International Court 
of Justice for this purpose. 
Alfar028 dealt mainly with the evolution of the idea of an international crim, 
inal jurisdiction, without adding much to the Secretariat's Historical Survey. 
He was unhesitatingly of the opinion that instituting an international criminal 
jurisdiction was both desirable and feasible "for the prevention and punish, 
ment of international crimes." 
If the rule of law is to govern the community of States and protect it against the 
violations of the International public order, it can only be satisfactorily established 
by the promulgation of an international penal code and by the permanent 
functioning of an international criminal jurisdiction (para. 136). 
Regarding the International Court of Justice, he pointed out that an 
amendment to Artiele 34 of the Statute would be required to establish a 
chamber of the Court with power to try States and individuals. With that 
proviso, he would answer the question in the affirmative (para. 134). 
Sandstrom29 concentrated more on the possibility of establishing an inter, 
national criminal judicial organ, carefully weighing the pros and cons. His con, 
elusions were negative: 
39. In my opinion the cons outweigh by far the pros. A permanent judicial 
criminal organ established in the actual organization of the international 
community would be impaired by very serious defects and would do more 
harm than good. The time cannot as yet be considered ripe for the 
establishment of such an organ. 
40. If such a judicial organ is to be established, it is submitted that, in view of the 
defects with which it would be impaired, it would be preferable to provide for 
the possibility of establishing a Criminal Chamber of the International Court 
of Justice in case of need. The defects would then be less noticeable, and 
such a possibility could perhaps in a given case meet the criticism voiced 
against the Niirnberg trial. 
The Commission dealt with the matter at its 41st to 44th meetings during its 
second session (1950). After votes, the Commission decided that the 
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establishment of an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged 
with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon it 
by international convention was desirable. It went on to decide that the estab-
lishment of such an international judicial organ was possible. Finally, it reported 
that it had paid attention to the possibility of establishing a criminal chamber of 
the International Court of] ustice and that, though it was possible to do so by 
amendment of the Court's Statute, the Commission did not recommend it.3o 
The General Assembly discussed this at its fifth session in 1950. The Cold 
War was dominating all activities in the United Nations then, not a promising 
moment for dispassionate consideration of so delicate a matter as the establish-
ment of an international criminal court. In Resolution 489 (V), December 12, 
1950, the General Assembly showed that a final decision regarding the setting up 
of an international penal tribunal could not be taken except on the basis of con-
crete proposals. It accordingly established a Committee composed of 17 Member 
States "to prepare one or more preliminary draft conventions and proposals re-
lating to the establishment and the statute of an international criminal court. "31 
The Committee was in session from August 1 to 31, 1951.32 It produced a 
draft statute for an international criminal court in 55 articles (excluding the 
preamble and the final clauses). It also adopted a vreu in which, referring to the 
Genocide Convention, it expressed the wish that along with the instrument es-
tablishing the International Criminal Court, a provision should be drawn up 
conferring jurisdiction on that Court in respect of the crime of genocide. The 
report is important. It set out the first general outline of the structure of the 
proposed tribunal. The draft statute was divided into several chapters, on gen-
eral principles (Articles 1-3), the organization of the Court (Articles 4-24), 
the competence of the Court (Articles 25-32), the committing authOrity and 
prosecuting authority, not an organ of the court, the Committee drawing the 
attention of the General Assembly to the need to establish special investigatory 
and prosecuting machinery (Articles 33-34), procedure (Articles 35-53), 
clemency (Article 54) and final provisions (Article 55). That has remained the 
basic structure for the international criminal court. Among the deficiencies of 
the draft was Article 2, on the law to be applied, except that the Rome Statute 
has included the prosecution among the organs of the new Court, a curious 
abandonment of any idea of the separation of powers. It was pari:ly similar to 
Moynier's 1872 suggestion, and partly reflected the ICRe's change of direc-
tion, aiming at incorporating the relevant provisions in national criminal law: 
"The Court shall apply international law, including international criminal law, 
and where appropriate, national law." There were other deficiencies. The draft 
was subjected to a series of critical written observations by several 
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governments, including some that had been represented on the Committee, 
and even more serious criticism in the Sixth Committee's debate that year.33 
The General Assembly then adopted Resolution 687 (VII), December 5, 
1952.34 Here it decided to appoint another committee of 17 Member States to 
be designated by the President of the General Assembly (Lester Pearson of 
Canada). Its mandate was more complicated. The new Committee was, in the 
light of the 'comments and suggestions of governments, (i) to explore the impli~ 
cations and consequences of establishing an international criminal court and of 
the various methods by which this might be done; (ii) to study the relationship 
between such a court and the United Nations and its organs; and (iii) to reex~ 
amine the draft statute. This resolution brought out the more general complex~ 
ities of the subject, something that before had not been clear. 
The 1953 Committee was in session between July 27 and August 20, 1953. 
In its report, it in effect followed what the earlier Committee had reported, sug~ 
gesting only some minor changes in the Statute as previously drafted. On the 
central issue of the law to be applied, Article 2 merely repeated unchanged Ar~ 
ticle 2 of the earlier draft.35 In Resolution 898 (IX), December 4, 1954, the 
General Assembly did not really accept this. It noted the connection between 
the question of defining aggression, the draft Code of Offenses against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, and the question of an international criminal 
jurisdiction. It decided to postpone consideration of the international criminal 
court until the General Assembly had taken up again the questions of the defi~ 
nition of aggression and the draft Code of Offenses. This well brings out that at 
that time the question of the applicable law continued to be the central issue of 
interest on the political level. Simultaneously, in Resolution 895 (IX) of the 
same date, the General Assembly established a new special committee to sub~ 
mit in 1956 a detailed report with a draft definition of aggression. At the same 
time the International Law Commission submitted a report on the draft Code of 
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.36 In Resolution 897 (IX), 
also of December 4, 1954, the General Assembly, referring to its decision regard~ 
ing the definition of aggression, decided to postpone further consideration of the 
Code until the Committee on the definition of aggression had submitted its re~ 
port. The three items in that way became bound together, a triad. The decision 
to postpone these items sine die was a direct consequence of the Cold War. 
The Special Committee on the Definition of Aggression submitted its report 
in 1956.37 Meanwhile, the early crisis of the United Nations on the admission 
of new members had been resolved and the beginnings of the decolonization 
process were taking place. Those two processes produced profound changes in 
the composition and institutional character of the United Nations, especially 
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the General Assembly. In Resolution 1181 (XII), November 29, 1957, the 
General Assembly noted that 22 additional States had recently joined the 
United Nations. It requested the Secretary,General to take the view of the new 
Member States and to place the question of defining aggression on the provi, 
sional agenda of the General Assembly not earlier than its 14th session (1959), 
after another special committee had advised him that it considered the time 
appropriate. That resolution was adopted on a roll, call vote, something rare on 
draft resolutions coming from the Sixth Committee, of 42:24: 15 with one State 
absent. The negative votes were cast by the Soviet Bloc together with some 
Latin American, Arab, and other States, and the abstentions were similarly 
scattered. That vote shows the impact of the Cold War and the changing com, 
position of the General Assembly on what was nothing more than a procedural 
decision, in effect deferring consideration of the matter for another two years at 
least. However, no recommendation to renew discussion of the definition of 
aggression was ever made. 
Meanwhile, as the Cold War continued, the decolonization process pro' 
duced an enormous increase in the membership of the United Nations, com, 
pletely changing all voting patterns in the General Assembly and in diplomatic 
conferences and enhancing the role of "consensus" in decision making as op, 
posed to a majority vote. On top of that, the Six Days War (1967) led to a rna, 
jor international crisis. That was to generate a new phase in the development of 
each of these three interlocked items. To widespread surprise, the Soviet Un, 
ion took the initiative. Before the exercise was completed, the Soviet Union, 
and with it the Soviet Bloc in the United Nations, had also collapsed, leading 
to further profound changes in the composition and character of the United 
Nations overall, and the General Assembly in particular. 
This first United Nations phase had brought out two aspects in particular: 
(i) the close connection that exists between the establishment of an Interna, 
tional Criminal Court and the law to be applied, quite apart from any question 
arising out of the Genocide Convention; and (ii) the question of the relation, 
ship to exist between the criminal court and the United Nations, and in par tic, 
ular the Security Council. It also showed that on the political level the question 
of the law to be applied contained at least two separate elements, namely the 
definition of aggression and the code of offenses against the peace and security 
of mankind, that item itself being more directly the offshoot of the Nurnberg 
Judgment. Further developments regarding the court would therefore depend 
on the progress in those two other matters. 
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The Definition of Aggression, the Code of Crimes 
and the Geneva Red Cross Conference (1967-1991) 
On September 22, 1967, the USSR requested the inclusion in the agenda of 
the 22nd session of the General Assembly of a tendentiously worded additional 
item entitled: "Need to expedite the drafting of a definition of aggression in the 
light of the present international situation." The item was taken on the agenda 
after a bitter procedural debate. In an unusual procedure it was allocated to 
plenary meetings for a general debate, and then, in light of that debate and the 
results achieved, to the Sixth Committee. The General Assembly decided in 
Resolution 2330 (XXII), December 18, 1967, to establish a Special Committee 
on the Question of Defining Aggression to consider all aspects of the question 
and to report back to the General Assembly. Retracing the subsequent devel, 
opments is not necessary here. It is sufficient to say that in Resolution 3314 
(XXIX), December 14,1974, the General Assembly, without a vote, adopted a 
definition of aggression.38 That definition does not, however, deal with "the 
crime of aggression" as a matter of the criminal responsibility of an individual. 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute includes "the crime of aggression" among the 
crimes over which the new International Criminal Court will have jurisdiction. 
As it is, it does not explain what that means for individual criminal responsibil, 
ity. In Resolution F annexed to its Final Act, the Conference requested the 
Preparatory Commission established by that resolution inter alia to prepare pro, 
posals for a provision on aggression for submission to the Assembly of States 
Parties at a Review Conference.39 Although the Niirnberg and Tokyo Tribu, 
nals had little difficulty in dealing with charges of crimes against peace by the 
planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression against the 
accused before them-all senior officers of the State-the problem today is 
complicated because of the existence of the Security Council with primary re, 
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The issue 
to be faced is whether the International Criminal Court can have jurisdiction 
over a case of aggression regardless of whether the Security Council has for, 
mally determined that an act of aggression has taken place (Charter, Article 
39). 
In 1968 the Special Committee on the Definition of Aggression drew the 
General Assembly's attention to the question of the Draft Code of Offenses 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, but no action was taken then. 
When the General Assembly adopted the definition of aggression, it again took 
note of observations by the Secretary,General regarding the Draft Code and 
the international criminal court, without adopting then any ope~ative 
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decision.40 In 1977 the International Law Commission raised the question of 
renewing consideration of the Draft Code. In Resolution 33/97, December 16, 
1978, the General Assembly requested the Secretary~General to ascertain 
views of Member States and relevant intergovernmental organizations, a re~ 
quest that was reiterated in Resolution 35/97, December 4, 1980. In Resolution 
36/106, December 10, 1981, the General Assembly invited the International 
Law Commission to resume its work on that topic. The International Law 
Commission recommenced its work in 1982. In 1996 it adopted what is now 
named the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
and submitted it to the General Assembly.41 
In Resolution 44/39, December 4, 1989, dealing with trafficking in narcotics 
across national frontiers, the General Assembly invited the International Law 
Commission, when considering the Draft Code, to address the question of es~ 
tablishing an international criminal court or other international criminal trial 
mechanism with jurisdiction over persons alleged to have committed crimes 
that may be covered under such a code, including persons engaged in illicit 
trafficking in narcotic drugs across national frontiers. This showed that politi~ 
cal thinking was beginning to envisage a wider role for the proposed interna~ 
tional criminal jurisdiction than for the Genocide or Apartheid Conventions or 
to enforce the law applicable in times of armed conflict. In 1992 the Commis~ 
sion included a detailed survey of the question in its examination of the Draft 
Code.42 
One other major event of this period, formally outside the United Nations, 
was the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of In~ 
ternational Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. That Confer~ 
ence, in session from 1974 to 1977, was, as is traditional for the Geneva 
Conventions, convened and organized by the Swiss Government to examine 
and adopt texts based on 'preparatory work undertaken by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. That Conference completed its work with the 
adoption of two instruments, formally entitled Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949. One related to the Protection ofVic~ 
tims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and the second to the Pro~ 
tection of Victims ofNon~international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Those 
two instruments are important additions to and updates of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. They include very carefully drafted and reasonably comprehen~ 
sive listings of what those instruments classify as breaches or grave breaches, al~ 
though some of them are controversial and not universally accepted. Together 
with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protection of war victims, they 
completed the process of establishing the rules of international humanitarian 
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law as a self~standing branch of the law, not dependent on the existence of a 
formal state of war. In that way they bring the Geneva law into line with the 
fundamental rule of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter, prohibiting the 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. It 
is to be noted that the detailing of war crimes in Article 8 of the Rome Statute 
does not always follow exactly the language of the Geneva Conventions and 
the Additional Protocols as regards breaches and grave beaches. This is a possi~ 
ble cause of difficulty for the new court. The Rome Conference may have ex~ 
ceeded its formal mandate when it made those changes.43 
To Rome (1992-1998) 
In Resolution 47/33, November 25, 1992, the General Assembly requested 
the Secretary~General to seek written comments of States on that section of 
the report of the International Law Commission in which the Commission, as 
requested, addressed the issue of the proposed criminal court. At the same 
time, in a marked change from its attitude in the 1950s, it invited the Commis~ 
sion to continue its work on the question by undertaking to prepare a draft stat~ 
ute for the proposed court as a matter of priority. Accordingly, in 1993 the 
Commission reconvened the Working Group, which prepared what it termed a 
preliminary version of the draft statute for an international criminal tribunal 
and commentaries thereto.44 In Resolution 48/31, December 4, 1993, the Gen~ 
eral Assembly requested the Commission to continue its work as a matter of 
priority, and if possible to submit a draft statute in 1994. This the Commission 
did. It reestablished a new Working Group and went on to draw up a complete 
Statute in 60 articles with commentaries, together with an Annex and three 
Appendices. The Commission recommended to the General Assembly to con~ 
vene an international conference of plenipotentiaries to study the draft statute 
and to conclude a convention on the establishment of an international crimi~ 
nal court.45 
In that condition the question reve~ted to the political organs for the final 
decisions to be taken. The discussion in the General Assembly soon showed 
that the International Law Commission's draft was not widely accepted and 
could not, as it stood, form the basic text for an international plenipotentiary 
conference. Accordingly, the first step of the General Assembly was to estab~ 
lish an Ad hoc Committee open to all States members of the United Nations or 
of specialized agencies. In Resolution 49/53, December 9, 1994, the General 
Assembly set out the function of this new Committee requiring it to review the 
401 
Antecedents of the Rome Statute of the ICC Revisited 
major substantive and administrative issues arising out of the draft prepared by 
the International Law Commission. The report of that Ad hoc Committee came 
before the next session of the General Assembly.46 In Resolution 50/46, De~ 
cember 11, 1995, the General Assembly decided to establish a Preparatory 
Committee to continue preparing a widely acceptable consolidated text of a 
convention on an international criminal court as a next step towards consider~ 
ation by a conference of plenipotentiaries. It also decided to include the item in 
the provisional agenda of the 52nd session in order to study the report of the 
Preparatory Committee "and, in the light of that report, to decide on the con~ 
vening of a conference of plenipotentiaries to finalize and adopt a convention 
on the establishment of an international criminal court, including on the tim~ 
ing and duration of the Conference." Composition of the Committee was 
slightly adjusted and included States members of the International Atomic En~ 
ergy Agency, a technical modification. Some 90 States took part in the work of 
the Preparatory Committee at one stage or another. Comprising approximately 
one~half of the total membership of the organized international community, 
the Preparatory Committee was broadly representative of all trends that had to 
be taken into consideration. 
That Preparatory Committee was in session throughout 1996 and 1997. It 
reported to the 51st session of the General Assembly. In Resolution 51/207, 
December 17, 1996, the General Assembly noted that major substantive and 
administrative issues remained to be resolved. These included, apart from the 
definition of different crimes, such issues as the relationship between the inter~ 
national court and national jurisdictions (the problem of complementarity), 
the so~called trigger mechanism, and the relationship of the court to the 
United Nations, to mention but a few. At the same time it noted that despite 
this, the Preparatory Committee considered that it was realistic to regard the 
holding of a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries in 1998 as feasible. The 
General Assembly accordingly decided that the Preparatory Committee should 
continue its work, that the diplomatic conference should be held in 1998, and 
postponed to the next session decisions on "the necessary arrangements made 
for the diplomatic conference ... to be held in 1998, unless the General Assem~ 
bly decides otherwise in view of relevant circumstances."47 In Resolution 
52/160, December 15, 1997, the General Assembly again authorized the Prepa~ 
ratory Committee to continue its work early in 1998 and to transmit the text of 
its final report directly to the Conference.48 It also decided to hold the Confer~ 
ence in Rome between June 15 and July 17, 1998, and adopted relevant ancil~ 
lary decisions. 
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Three other major events occurred in this period of the prehistory of the es, 
tablishment of the International Criminal Court. On February 22, 1993, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 808 (1993). In that resolution it decided 
that an international tribunal should be established for the prosecution of per, 
sons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law com' 
mitted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. It requested the 
Secretary,General to submit for consideration by the Council, at the earliest 
possible date, and if possible no later than 60 days after the adoption of the res' 
olution, a report on all the aspects of this matter, including specific proposals 
and where appropriate options for the effective and expeditious implementa, 
tion of the decision, taking into account suggestions put forward by Member 
States. 
On May 3, the Secretary,General submitted his report.49 It is a lengthy doc, 
ument, and it draws on the 1953 Report on International CriminalJurisdiction 
(see note 35 above) as one of the sources consulted. On May 23 the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 827 (1993). In that resolution, acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, it approved the Secretary,General's report and de, 
cided to establish an international tribunal "for the sole purpose of prosecuting 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 
and a date to be determined by the Security Council upon the restoration of 
peace and to this end to adopt the Statute of the International Tribunal an, 
nexed to the above,mentioned report." The Tribunal (ICTY) was formed in 
November 1993 and is still in operation. 
This was followed in 1994 by the adoption of Resolution 955 (1994) on No, 
vember 8, 1994. Here, again acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Se, 
curity Council adopted the Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR). The Government of Rwanda asked for this tribunal to be established 
for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such vio, 
lations committed in the territory of neighboring States between January 1, 
1994 and December 31, 1994. Subject to that major difference over jurisdic, 
tion, the Statute of the ICTR follows closely the Statute of the ICTY, and a sin, 
gle Appeals Chamber acts for both tribunals. Unfortunately, little is known 
about the activities ofICTR. Nevertheless, it is the first international tribunal 
to have convicted and sentenced persons accused of the crime of genocide.50 
The third major event was the completion in 1996 by the I~ternational Law 
Commission of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
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Mankind.51 The General Assembly, in Resolution 51/160, December 15,1996, 
drew the attention of States participating in the preparatory committee on the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court to the relevance of the Code 
to their work. However, although the Preparatory Committee had the draft 
Code before it, it made no relevant recommendation and there is no reference 
to the Code as such in the Rome Statute.52 
That is the background against which the United Nations Diplomatic Con~ 
ference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court worked. 
Some Afterthoughts 
This historical recital of the complicated events leading up to the Rome 
Conference goes a long way in explaining the difficulties encountered by that 
Conference, its unfinished business, and the defects, both of form (lack of con~ 
cordance in the language versions and many presumed typographical errors in 
the "authentic" text) and of substance. 
In the 1950s, the General Assembly, correctly, requested the International 
Law Commission for its opinion on the feasibility and advisability of establish~ 
ing a permanent international criminal court. Equally correctly, it entrusted 
the work of preparing the statute of such a court to ad hoc intersessional com~ 
mittees composed of the representatives of States. The work of those ad hoc 
committees formed the basis for the report of the Secretary~Generalleading to 
the establishment by the Security Council of the Yugoslav Tribunal, and indi~ 
rectly also to that of the Rwanda Tribunal. Preparing the constituent instru~ 
ment of an international organization is neither progressive development of the 
law nor its progressive codification. It is a highly political act, requiring, of 
course, both political and legal inputs. In the case of an international criminal 
court, at least three branches of law are relevant-international law, criminal 
law, and military law, this latter both from the aspect of the internal discipline 
of the armed forces (chain of command) and from the point of view of military 
criminal law as such. The application of a rule of criminal law by a court~martial 
can be very different from the application of that same rule by a civil criminal 
court. 
In 1948 the General Assembly also correctly linked the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide with the eventual estab~ 
lishment of an international criminal court, without prejudice to the general 
international responsibility of a State in the event of breach by the State of its 
obligations under that Convention, and without prejudice to the obligation 
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imposed by Article V on all parties to enact appropriate legislation to give ef~ 
fect to the provisions of the Convention and in particular to provide effective 
penalties for persons guilty of genocide.53 At the same time it placed States un~ 
der the obligation to enact the necessary legislation to give effect to the provi~ 
sions of the Convention, and in particular to provide effective penalties for 
persons guilty of genocide or other offenses enumerated in the Convention 
(Article V). The International Law Commission continued along those lines by 
linking its proposed court to the Draft Code of Crimes. Again, in the 1980s, the 
General Assembly seems to have invited the International Law Commission to 
"address" the question of establishing an international criminal court, an~ 
swered by the Commission in its report of 1992 (note 41 above). In 1992 the 
General Assembly, in a complete reversal of its earlier position, and possibly 
without fully considering the implications, requested the Commission to pre~ 
pare the draft statute, which the Commission did in 1994 (note 45 above). It is 
to be observed that the International Law Commission, hurried by the General 
Assembly, did not follow its customary practice of giving its text two readings, 
the second taking place after an interval of two years on the basis of the obser~ 
vations, written and oral, of governments on the first draft. The result was that 
the Commission's final.text did not take sufficient account of the political atti~ 
tudes of the different governments and comment on them in its final report on 
the topic. The General Assembly accordingly had to establish two 
intersessional committees to study the text in light of political considerations, 
and yet the final report of the Preparatory Committee (note 48 above), which 
became the basic proposal for consideration by the Conference,54 contained a 
large number of square brackets, footnotes and options, pinpointing the ab~ 
sence of agreement on major issues. It was not a true basic text as that term is 
commonly understood in conference practice.55 What is more, it was com~ 
pleted and circulated to States only a short while before the opening of the 
Conference, allowing Governments little time or opportunity to give it the full 
consideration that it deserved and required, or to undertake the usual diplo~ 
matic consultations with other participants in the Conference. If the Rome 
Statute has defects, without doubt one explanation lies in the haste with which 
the Conference was convened, without adequate or completed preparatory 
work. 
Given this slow progress in the preparatory work and its incompleteness, it is 
difficult to understand how in Resolution 52/160, December 15, 1997, the 
General Assembly decided to convene a diplomatic conference of plenipoten~ 
tiaries a bare six months later to complete and adopt the convention, and al~ 
lowed only for five working weeks in all, that is thirty working days for that 
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Conference to complete its work. This final rush contrasts strangely with the 
slow and careful work that had been undertaken before 1992. 
It also seems that the organization of the Conference itself was atypical. Rule 
48 of the Rules of Procedure required the Conference to establish a Committee 
of the Whole. Normal conference practice is for the committee of the whole to 
examine the basic text, article by article, and to submit its conclusions to the 
plenary conference. It is not clear that this was done in all cases. From some of 
the statements made at the concluding session on July 17,1998, it appears that 
delegations had not been given a proper opportunity to express their views on 
portions of the text before it was put to the final vote in the Conference. In ad, 
dition, the long list of corrigenda submitted by the Secretariat, itself incomplete 
as mentioned, confirms that the arrangements for verification of the concor, 
dance of the six authentic language versions of the Convention were unsatis, 
factory. The extraordinarily large number of typographical corrigenda 
suggested by the Secretariat shows that the Drafting Committee (Rules of Pro, 
cedure, Article 49) and the Secretariat were not given sufficient time to com, 
plete their work properly. This adds up to a sorry story. 
* * * 
In 1996 the International Law Commission completed the first reading of its 
draft articles on the topic of State responsibility. Article 24, paragraph 5, of the 
Rome Statute lays down that no provision in the Statute relating to individual 
criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under interna, 
tionallaw.56 Likewise, Article 4 of the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind also states that the fact that the Code provides for the 
responsibility of individuals for crimes against the peace and security of man, 
kind is without prejudice to any question of the responsibility of States under 
international law. The Commentary to that article suggests that it is possible, 
indeed likely, that an individual may commit a crime against the peace and se, 
curity of mankind as an "agent of the State," "on behalf of the State," "in the 
name of the State," or even in a de facto relationship with the State, without 
being invested with legal power. The State may remain responsible and be un, 
able to exonerate itself from responsibility by invoking the prosecution or pun, 
ishment of the individuals who committed the crime. 57 This is pointing the way 
to a complicated set of legal relationships between States, and perhaps also be, 
tween courts and tribunals. 
Article 19 of the draft articles on State responsibility as adopted on first reading 
has a direct bearing on this. Article 19 in that form is headed "International 
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crimes and international delicts." It is, however, a confused article, not differ~ 
entiating clearly between acts of State of particular gravity and acts of the indi~ 
vidual that are themselves violations of rules of international law to which an 
individual is subjected, such as genocide.58 
It is interesting to note that throughout the prehistory of the Rome Statute, 
in which the applicable law was a central issue, little thought appears to have 
been given to the relationship of the general law of State responsibility and the 
international criminal law to be applied by the International Criminal Court. 
So far, the International Law Commission does not appear to have faced the 
matter until 1998, when it was raised for the first time.59 This issue was appar~ ; 
ent during the drafting of the Genocide Convention, as appears from the com~ 
bination of Articles VI and IX of that Convention, discussed earlier. Article 19 
was introduced into the draft articles on State responsibility in 1976, and there~ 
fore has been present throughout the greater part of the renewed discussions 
on the establishment of an international criminal court. This interrelationship 
is a matter to which further thought should be given, especially in connection 
with the provisions in the articles on State responsibility regarding the dis~ 
charge of the international responsibility, and in regard to the settlement of dis~ 
putes. Trial and punishment of the individual responsible for the crime coming 
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and that in fact in~ 
cludes all the crimes listed in Article 19 as it now stands that can be committed 
by an individual, may well be included as an element of satisfaction for the di~ 
rectly injured State. For this reason, the question arises whether the completed 
codification of the law of State responsibility should not contain a parallel pro~ 
vision, to the effect that nothing in that codification affects any question of 
criminal responsibility coming within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court. 
* * * 
When the Rome Statute enters into force, the international community will 
have three standing international tribunals at its disposal-the International 
Court of Justice (Iq) , the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). There is very little 
overlap between them as to jurisdiction, and the risk of the fragmentation of 
the law is slight. The case law of the two ad Me criminal tribunals. ICTY and 
ICTR, established by the Security Council, shows a marked tendency to seek 
guidance from the jurisprudence of the International Court. The limited expe~ 
rience to date ofITLOS shows a similar inclination, and one must presume that 
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the new International Criminal Court will act similarly if it is to gain general 
confidence. However, the existence of the ICJ and ITLOS alongside the ICC is 
likely to give rise to an unsuspected conflict, not of jurisdiction but of propriety, 
of whether one or other of these "civil" tribunals, the ICJ and ITLOS, can de, 
termine a case before it without causing detriment to the criminal tribunal. 
The difference has been pithily explained by the Trial Chamber ofICTY in the 
Celebici case: "The International Tribunal [ICTY] is a criminal judicial body, 
established to prosecute and punish crimes for violations of international hu, 
manitarian law, and not to determine State responsibility for acts of aggression 
or unlawful intervention."60 
The potential conflict is demonstrated by the Application of the Genocide 
Convention case in the International Court of Justice between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the one side, and Yugoslavia on the other. In that case the ap, 
plicant's claims have been met by the respondent's counterclaims.61 Both par, 
ties are alleging violations of the Genocide Convention by the other. The crime 
of genocide, when committed by an individual, comes within the jurisdiction of 
ICTY, and in due course of that of the International Criminal Court also (but 
that aspect can be ignored for present purposes). The Rwanda Tribunal has, as 
mentioned, already tried two cases of individuals accused of the crime of geno, 
cide (see note 50 above). The dispute between States over the interpretation, 
application or fulfillment of the Genocide Convention comes within the exclu, 
sive jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice. Although it is clear that 
the International Court itself is dealing with the "civil" responsibility of the 
parties, in the pleadings, the allegations and the defenses rest upon the actions 
of individuals. Should those individuals be called to testify in the International 
Court, they may be forced either not to reply to questions or to incriminate 
themselves. In that way the question arises how to reconcile the claims of 
States parties to reparation for alleged violations of the Genocide Convention 
as a matter of State responsibility, with the claims of the international commu, 
nity for criminal trials before a competent international tribunal of those indi, 
viduals accused of committing acts of genocide. The matter can be put the 
other way round. How, in such circumstances, can the right of an individual, 
accused of genocide, to a fair trial, required by Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966,62 with the possi, 
bility of an acquittal, be reconciled with the right of the States parties to the liti, 
gation in the International Court to have their claims decided by the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations? 
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In such circumstances, the human rights law, many elements of which are 
regarded as possessing the quality of jus cogens, should have priority over the 
law of State responsibility. 
* * * 
It has been seen how in the intermediate stage of this history, the General 
Assembly found a close connection to exist between three separate topics on 
a shared agenda with the International Law Commission: the definition of 
aggression, the Draft Code of Crimes, and the international criminal court. 
For a certain period the General Assembly attempted to keep them in step. To 
that triad there has also to be added the codification of the law of State respon~ 
sibility, which the International Law Commission is planning to complete by 
the year 2001. Events, however, have unraveled the initial triad, which never, 
until now, has considered the law of State responsibility to belong to this 
complex. 
Under a series of resolutions annexed to the Final Act of the Rome Confer~ 
ence (note 42 above), unfinished business of the Conference to be considered 
in due course by the Review Conference envisaged in Article 123 of the Statute 
includes an acceptable definition of terrorism and drug trafficking and their in~ 
clusion in the list of crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. In addition, the Pre~ 
paratory Commission is required to prepare draft texts for what is termed 
"Elements of Crimes" addressed in Articles 9 and 21 of the Statute, this to be 
done before the year 2000. It is also to prepare proposals for a provision on ag~ 
gression, including the definition and elements of crimes of aggression and the 
conditions under which the International Criminal Court shall exercise its ju~ 
risdiction with regard to that crime. 
This wide remit to the Preparatory Commission, far beyond what is usual 
for a preparatory commission, coinciding in time with the second reading of 
the draft articles on State responsibility in the International Law Commission, 
and during the process of the final decision on the draft Code of Crimes, pro~ 
vides the opportunity to put together a complete and properly co~ordinated 
set of black letter texts embracing the whole law of international responsibil~ 
ity, including the "civil responsibility" of States, international organizations, 
and other actors on the international scene capable of sustaining a claim of 
international responsibility, and the international criminal responsibility of 
individuals charged with breaching the basic rules of international humani~ 
tarian law and other rules of international law laying down international 
crimes. 
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Appendix 
French Translation of Letter of F. Lieber to 
General G. H. Dufour, New York, April 10, 1872 (See note 8) 
Monsieur, 
J'ai re~u il y a quelques jours votre honoree lettre du 1 fevrier ... Je 
m'empresse de vous donner mon opinion, malgre la divergence qui peut 
exister entre nos vues concernant I'application des principes sur lesquels 
nous sommes completement d'accord. 
Je suis un des juristes qui se sont declares, de la maniere la plus claire et la 
plus expresse, en faveur de l' expansion et de la multiplication constante de 
I'arbitrage et de la conciliation entre nations. 
J'ai meme fortement recommande de retourner a la coutume de 
moyen~age, et de prendre pour arbitres internationaux les facultes de droit 
des universites en renomj mais je me suis prononce deja dans mes Political 
Ethics contre !'idee d'une Haute~Cour internationale, par laquelle tous les 
differends entre nations seraient decides. J'ai cru que la realisation de cette 
idee, quand meme elle serait possible, ne serait nisouhaitable ni efficace. Je 
n'ai pas change d'opinion. 
QUi serait Ie sheriff (I'executeur des decisions) d'une haute Cour des na~ 
tions? Et quel est meme Ie tribunal ordinaire dont les jugements feraient 
quelque impression, si l'on ne savait que ses arrets seront appliques par Ie 
pouvoir public? II est vrai que Hugo Grotius fut cite comme autorite au 
Congres des nations Europeennes a Vienne. Mais s'il fut cite ainsi 
au~dessus des monarques, des ministres et des nations, c'est precisement 
parce qu'il n'etait qu'un simple particulier, absent de la lutte et ayant ecrit 
son ouvrage sur la paix et la guerre, sous la dictee de la raison et de la jus~ 
tice, sans se preoccuper aucunement des cas en question, qui appelaient les 
lumieres de la raison et de la justice. 
Des nations libres seraient toujours dans une position desavantageuse 
devant un pareil tribunal: car les gouvernements plus ou moins 
despotiques sont toujours mieux places que les nations libres pour cabaler 
et intriguer, et les nations libres ont specialement besoin d'autonomie. Ce 
besoin, sans equivaloir a l'isolement, croltra avec les progres de la liberte et 
Ie developpement du self~govemment. Je suis parfaitement certain que peu 
des citoyens americains consentiraient a confier une affaire litigieuse dans 
laquelle leur republique serait interessee, a une Haute~Cour internationale 
permanente, quelque favorable qu'il puisse etre a des tribunaux d'arbitrage 
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etablis par des traites speciaux. Le pouvoir de ces derniers tribunaux et 
l'autorite de leurs decisions sont diis precisement a la raison qu'ils sont 
constitues par consentement mutuel, et pour l'occasion speciale dont il 
s'agit. Ce n'est-pas une jalousie puerile, mais Ie besoin de l'autonomie qui 
empecherait une nation libre de quelqu'importance de se rallier a une 
Haute-Cour internationale permanente. 
T outes ces raisons s'appliquent avec beaucoup plus grande force au tribu-
nal international que vous proposez pour juger les infractions a la conven-
tion de Geneve en cas de guerre. Vous dites, art. 6 ; les jugements du tribunal 
seront notifies par lui aux gouvemements interesses et ceux ci seront tenus 
d'injliger aux coupables les peines prononcees contre eux. 
Tenus? Par qui les gouvernements respectifs seront-ils tenus de punir ceux 
qui ant viole les regles de la Convention de Geneve, si les belligerants ne Ie 
font par leur propre volonte? Les temps recents nous ont fourni deux ex-
amples de peuples,-l'un en Europe, l'autre en Amerique,-succombant 
l'un et l'autre parce qu'ils etaient enerves par la vanite. Les infractions aux 
principes protecteurs de la Convention de Geneve ont ete frequentes; 
peut-on imaginer la soumission aux jugements du tribunal international de 
la part de ceux qui frequemment ont meconnu les lois les plus elementaires 
de la guerre? Et quand je parle de la Convention de Geneve ne vous 
meprenez pas, je vous prie, sur mes sentiments a son egard. Rien n' est plus 
sacre ames yeux que ce spectacle de la charite se mettant au pas du tam-
bour et marchant en avant, non pour se battre, mais pour relever les blesses 
or pour succomber elle-meme dans l'accomplissement de cette tache. Mais 
je m'occupe seulement ici de ce qu'il y a de praticable ou de desirable dans 
l'execution de votre plan. 
Si la Confederation suisse doit etre a perpetuite la gardienne de ce tribunal 
international, qu'arrlvera-t-il au cas ou la Suisse elle-meme serait 
enveloppee dans une guerre? Elle l'a ete, pourquoi ne Ie serait-elle pas de 
nouveau? II ya des moments OU les nations ne peuvent s'empecher de faire 
ce que Solon exigeait de chaque citoyen en temps de discorde civile. 
Vous voyez par ce que j'ai dit que, quant a moi, je ne suis pas partisan de 
l'etablissement permanent de tribunaux charges de statuer entre bel-
ligerants. Cependant j'applaudis a tout ce qui, a quelque degre que ce soit, 
tend a faire planner la raison, la justice et la charite, comme une nuee 
bienfaisante, sur la plus ardente chaleur du combat. C'est ce que savent 
taus ceux qui ont connaissance du Code des lois de la guerre sur terre, que 
j'ai con~u et ecrit, et que Ie President Lincoln a publie comme ordre 
general pour la conduite des armees americaines, en 1863. Je ne voudrais 
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donc pas vous conseiller d'arreter brusquement tous vos efforts pour 
donner une efficacite de plus en plus grande a la Convention de Geneve. 
Poursuivez-Ies avec zele et ne regardez les contrarietes que comme au stim-
ulant a des nouvelles tentatives. Car votre cause est sacree. 
Comme remarque generale, je me permets de repeter a cette occasion 
qu'une des choses les plus efficaces et les plus utiles que 1'on puisse faire, en 
cette matiere, pour ameliorer les rapports entre nations dans la paix ou 
dans la guerre (et il y a des rapports mutuels [intercourse] dans la guerre, 
attendu que 1'homme ne peut se rencontrer avec l'homme sans qu'il en 
resulte un echange de rappotts),-une des choses dont il y aurait Ie plus a 
attendre dans 1'interet de 1'intemationalisme, serait la reunion des plus 
eminents jurisconsultes du droit des gens que possede notre race 
cis-caucasienne,-un de chaque pays,---en leur capacite individuelle et 
non en vertu de quelque mandat public, pour regler entre eux certaines 
grandes questions du droit des nations, qui sont encore indecises,-telles 
que la neutralite, l' emploi de troupes barbares comme auxiliaires, la duree 
des droits ou des obligations fondees sur la qualite de citoyen. J'entends 
regler comme Grotius reglait ce dont il s' occupait, par Ie grand argument de 
la justice. Ce qui emanerait d'un pareil corps, code ou proclamation, serait 
certain d'acquerir bientot une autorite superieure au livre du plus grand 
juriste isole. J'espere qu'une pareille reunion pourra avoir lieu en 1873 ou 
1874. 
Avec la plus haute consideration, etc. 
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